Should elections be held when civil conºicts end? Does allowing combatants to compete as political parties, an increasingly common aspect of negotiated settlements, 1 reduce the chances that conºict will recur? This article seeks to assess the effect of these post-conºict elections on the likelihood of enduring peace.
tion that guarantees the terms of the agreement through force, considered common wisdom for how to overcome commitment problems, is often costly and therefore not thought to be credible to combatants. A more credible mechanism for external engagement, however, involves the expansion of democracy-promotion programs since the Cold War, 13 which has increased the ability of international actors to engage in elections in many states, including post-conºict states. Electoral participation provisions aid in the enforcement of negotiated settlements because they establish cycles coinciding with electoral processes-for example, political party registration and campaigns-that coordinate actors' efforts at detecting and sanctioning noncompliance with settlements. Increasing external engagement in these processes, then, offers a mechanism for international actors to monitor and enforce combatant compliance. This theory of external engagement implies that electoral participation provisions, together with democracy-promotion programs, produce less precarious settlements and more enduring peace between signatories.
To test the explanatory power of external engagement theory and competing theories, 14 I collected and analyzed the text of all 110 civil conºict settlements negotiated from 1975 to 2005 to identify which ones contain electoral participation provisions. I also developed measures to capture combatants' expectations of external engagement through the electoral process. Using these measures, I analyzed conºict recurrence between the signatories. In addition, employing both cross-national data and case evidence, I examined whether the electoral participation provisions were implemented, as well as whether external actors engaged in the elections.
I ªnd that peace endured between signatories in 79 percent of civil conºict settlements with electoral participation provisions (33 of 42 cases), a considerably better outcome than for settlements with other provisions, where peace endured in only 44 percent of settlements (30 of 68 cases). Robustness checks conªrmed these results. Further, the case of El Salvador, where the 1992 peace agreement provided for the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) to compete in the 1994 elections, offers evidence consistent with the mechanism of external engagement.
This article proceeds as follows. The ªrst section situates electoral participa- tion provisions in the context of the literature on peace agreements. The second section introduces the theory of how electoral participation provisions can overcome crucial commitment problems to settle civil conºicts through external engagement. It also speciªes testable implications that distinguish this theory from alternatives. The third section tests quantitatively the initial implications of my theory using new cross-national data. The fourth section tests the mechanism qualitatively using case evidence from El Salvador. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the theory for post-conºict elections and external enforcement.
Commitment Problems and the Puzzle of Elections
Common bargaining approaches to civil war termination posit that signing a settlement is beneªcial for combatants because ªghting is typically costly. 15 If, however, the combatants do not consider ªghting sufªciently costly-for example, when they can pass the costs of ªghting on to other actors or when they could lose social support if they stop ªghting-they are unlikely to settle. An example is India since 2004, where the central state redistributed resources to regional governments to counter Maoist insurgencies, producing beneªts and thus incentives at the local level to continue ªghting. 16 When outside sponsors or civilian supporters of the combatants tire of the conºict, it may become "ripe" for settlement, making a peace agreement more likely. 17 , pp. 27-43. I use the terms "combatants," "warring factions," and "sides" to refer collectively to the rebel group(s) and the government in conºict with each other, including when discussing the period after the settlement. Fighting has to take place between a government and at least one rebel group to qualify as a "civil conºict," and negotiations for settlements take place between these actors, too. Some cases, however, have more than one rebel group, or even involve multiple governments. Additional studies could further explore dynamics of more combatants in these contexts. "Rebel groups" are deªned here as nongovernmental organizations using violence to achieve a political agenda. This deªnition ªts closely with the UCDP/PRIO deªnition of "armed actors." See Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., "Armed Conºict 1946-2001: A New Dataset," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No. 5 (2002), pp. 615-637, which I use as the basis for the cross-national data. "Governments" are deªned here as the actors that rebel groups oppose. In most cases, "government" refers to the established state before the civil conºict began. In other cases, especially conºicts after a colonial power withdraws (as in the Republic of the Congo), I consider the incumbent or, if none exists, the side that has more control and international recognition, as the "government." I generally treat rebel groups and governments as unitary actors for simplicity, although they may have different factions with different preferences. Further study could also consider these dynamics. 16 with this scope condition met, if one side fears defection by the others, the settlement may remain precarious. 18 Commitment problems complicate the ability of settlements to produce enduring peace. 19 If one side is even temporarily weaker relative to its opponent during the peace process, that opponent has an incentive to grab more power than provided for in the settlement. Even the possibility of this happening may cause one side to defect because it believes that its opponent will do so. For example, a rebel group might interpret a slight delay or deviation in integrating the group into the state's power structure as a signal that the government is seeking to change the rules to allow it to maintain more power; the delay, however, might have been inadvertent, the result of low implementation capacity or a different understanding of the timeline. But in either case, the rebel group's concerns may drive the group to back out of the peace process. Commitment problems can thereby make peace precarious in several ways: (1) by incentivizing surprise attacks before disarmament, (2) by returning to the battleªeld targets of reneging opponents (whose violations may be violent or solely political) to protect their share of power or to punish those seeking to reduce it, or (3) by driving those who fear such reneging to do the same preemptively. 20 Commitment problems, therefore, have both an informational dimension and an incentive dimension.
Establishing a new government in the wake of a civil conºict that distributes power between the warring factions such that the payoffs from peace at least match those that the combatants could expect from continued ªghting is difªcult given the likelihood of commitment problems. Simultaneity and precision are hard to achieve, so even incremental processes of change (such as demobilizing units from each side in alternation or registering supporters of each side to vote) are inevitably accompanied by moments of weakness on each side. 21 For a settlement to successfully end a civil conºict, therefore, commitment problems must be overcome. Sharing power is sometimes proposed as a mechanism to provide mutual beneªts and reduce the marginal gains for each side from reneging on a peace deal. 22 In some cases, elections, especially those with electoral participation provisions, may paradoxically complicate the ability of the parties to share power. Indeed, compared to ªxed-formula power sharing, elections may not provide the same certainty that the sides will indeed share power. 23 However, electoral participation provisions can be adjusted to provide some certainty. 24 For example, in cases in which the core conºict includes an ethnic component, ethnic quotas can ensure that power distributed through voting matches each side's expected distribution of power from ªghting. And importantly, many settlements with electoral participation provisions, such as those in Burundi and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Colombia's peace agreement with indigenous ªghters in the early 1990s, contained quotas or other mechanisms to guarantee the distribution of power. 25 At the same time, however, by reducing the role of voters, such adjustments may make elections less normatively appealing. So why include electoral participation provisions in negotiated settlements?
Electoral Participation Provisions and Enduring Peace
In this section, I discuss the importance of international actors in helping combatants overcome commitment problems to secure enduring settlements. 26 Next, I introduce my theory of external engagement, which depends on elec- toral participation provisions. I then consider the theory's implications for enduring peace and those of some alternative theories. credible commitments and outside actors As discussed earlier, to ensure an enduring commitment to a peace agreement, the parties must expect noncompliance to be costlier than compliance. For example, if the government seeks to change laws before former rebels are integrated into governing bodies, then outside actors may withdraw funding for the government's parties and programs. In most cases, such sanctions are possible only when external actors who are not biased toward either side are available to enforce the settlement. I argue that these sufªciently impartial external actors must have credible leverage-that is, sanctions they can use against any party that fails to comply with the terms of the settlement. And to target sanctions appropriately, they must also have sufªcient information about the parties' record of compliance. Finally, they must be able to enforce peace agreements at a sufªciently low cost to themselves.
The informational and incentive dimensions of the commitment problem require that external actors monitor compliance with the terms of the settlement, offer conditional incentives for compliance, and threaten sanctions for noncompliance. Because both sides have incentives to credibly commit to a mutually beneªcial agreement, the incentives and sanctions need only be greater than what either side can seize through noncompliance. 27 These incentives and sanctions, however, are effective only if they are applied over the entire implementation period to both sides. Asymmetries in monitoring or in the imposition of sanctions in the case of noncompliance will exacerbate the commitment problem and increase the probability of a return to conºict.
In addition, the enforcement mechanism is effective only if the external actor is credible, which may not be the case with armed intervention. Common wisdom has conceptualized enforcement as troops verifying compliance and threatening forceful punishment for violations. 28 In theory, armed interveners could solve the commitment problem, but armed intervention is typically less credible than enforcement through elections because it can be costly for outsiders in terms of resources expended and lives lost over time. In practice, the evi-International Security 41:4 100 27. The agreement's design can also further decrease the amount of leverage needed. Through incrementalism, it can minimize the amount of power each side could grab by noncompliance. For instance, the agreement can specify that units of each side demobilize in alteration, so that each side only ever has slightly less relative strength. The agreement might call for land redistribution or distribution of other political beneªts to occur in a similar fashion. 28. Based on Walter, Committing to Peace, although Walter does not specify the mechanism as forceful coercion. Others suggest numerous potential mechanisms. See, for example, Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? dence suggests that even armed interveners, often UN peacekeepers, employ conditional incentives rather than force to induce compliance-for example, shaming belligerents, withdrawing aid, or preventing party participation in political activities. 29 Sending troops is still costly, though, and thus relatively rare, even if they are not threatening force. 30 Combatants may also try to settle a civil conºict without the involvement of international actors. Settlements can establish territorial strongholds for the warring factions, allowing them to maintain control and keep their arms to defend themselves against violations by the other side. An example is the 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts peace agreement in Bangladesh. The peace produced from such settlements, however, is often precarious.
external engagement theory According to external engagement theory, peace agreements with electoral participation provisions facilitate international enforcement of settlements. They do so by increasing coordination, lowering the cost for international actors to gather information, and applying leverage on combatants to incentivize compliance, which in many cases is augmented by cultural norms and institutions. 31 (See table 1 for an overview of the theory.) increased coordination. Electoral participation provisions increase coordination because electoral cycles provide multiple, easily observable cues as to whether participating combatant parties are complying with the terms of the settlement. As James Fearon writes, "[T]he institution of publicly understood rules for regular elections" provides signals that actors can use to observe and coordinate their behavior. 32 Following settlements, electoral participation provisions serve two important functions in coordinating enforcement. 33 . Coordination, a crucial element in this argument, can be accomplished through a variety of institutions, but electoral processes may work best to provide information from multiple actors and respond to noncompliance with an agreement. 33. The elections that they produce, however, need not be open. In fact, the elections need to be they enumerate regular public benchmarks agreed upon by the combatants and outside observers. They require publicly identifying who is eligible to run for ofªce, the resources that will be made available to their campaigns, how the winner will be chosen, the resources that the winners will control and how they will exercise that control procedurally, and when each stage will occur. This stands in contrast to, for example, private promises of future government appointments and resource distribution. Second, electoral participation provisions constitute an ongoing set of regular milestones. The recurring electoral cycles consist of a timetable of observable events, including voter registration, the announcement of candidates, campaign periods, voting, and the installation of elected leaders, as well as non-electoral provisions pegged in the settlement to this timetable (such as demobilization, which may be established as a prerequisite for party registration). 34 Thus, all of the actors know not only what is expected of the combatants in terms of compliance but also by when. These public benchmarks and regular milestones enable all of the actors to observe signals from various constituents about clearly deªned standards of compliance.
The coordination built into electoral participation provisions can also increase leverage, which can be used to sanction noncompliance. Elections culminate in the redistribution of power, producing a risk for combatants of losing even their promised share of power within the state or within the party-a risk that other actors can inºuence. Politicians are especially vulnerable to the threat of withdrawal of international assistance; candidates and elected ofªcials typically enjoy both domestic and international beneªts provided to their parties in the form of salaries, stipends, access, and the ability to govern effectively in their communities or provide patronage to their supporters. Therefore, the threat of sanctions can be brought to bear on individual candidates in favor of other prospects or on parties in favor of other parties. A foreign state, for instance, might freeze the democracy and governance assistance funds that it provides to a government just before an election if the incumbent party attempts to change laws before its opponent is incorporated into the state's structures (which may make it harder for that party to campaign effectively to secure seats).
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designed so that payoffs from the electoral process are greater than those gained from war, as discussed above. Any settlement requires such payoffs. Depending on the relative power of the combatants, the payoffs may include party funding (e.g., Colombia 1990-91), substantial institutional bias toward the status quo (e.g., South Africa 1991), or even ethnic quotas (e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995). 34. Indeed, Matanock, "International Insurance"; and Matanock, Electing Peace demonstrate that in more than 90 percent of cases in which ªrst elections occurred, second elections were held without major delays.
At the conclusion of a civil conºict, domestic actors-civil society, in particular-are often weak and typically polarized. They are thus unlikely to be able to monitor and incentivize compliance in a sufªciently impartial manner. 35 Although domestic actors can sometimes help provide information on combatant actions, which can be checked by outside actors, they have little credibility in detecting and sanctioning noncompliance.
International actors are therefore needed, at least initially, to "mediate and supervise joint disarmament and state-building." 36 Because enforcement Bullets for Ballots 103 35 . In Central America, for example, those working with the United Nations found domestic society to be susceptible to manipulation by politicians as well as alienated from the political process. See Jean Arnault, "Good Agreement? Bad Agreement? An Implementation Perspective," Princeton University, 2011, p. 11; and William Stanley, Enabling Peace in Guatemala: The Story of MINUGUA (Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 2013), p. 289. 36. Wantchekon, "The Paradox of 'Warlord' Democracy," pp. 17, 27. Elections also offer the possibility of incremental change by gradually allowing more input from citizens as they become more Each side has incentives to grab more power when it is relatively strong and its opponent is complying with the terms of the settlement, producing credible commitment problems.
OUTSIDERS CAN HELP
Outsiders with sufªcient information and credible leverage can enforce compliance, but how?
ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION PROVISIONS ALTERNATIVE
• Coordination around election benchmarks and milestones that culminate in the distribution of power increases the amount of information and leverage; outsiders can verify and incentivize compliance at these points.
• After the Cold War, interest in international involvement to help end civil conºict increased and democracy-promotion programs spread, facilitating external engagement through the electoral process.
Armed actors monitor and threaten coercive force for noncompliance.
Armed intervention is typically less credible than external engagement because it can be costly for outsiders in terms of casualties and resource expenditures.
Outside enforcement based on electoral participation provisions is low cost and therefore typically credible. Peace agreements with electoral participation provisions are thus more enduring, particularly when they have clear expectations of external engagement.
Peace agreements that depend solely on armed intervention by outsiders are rare and may fail as the interveners' credibility falters.
works only if the parties believe that they will be sanctioned for noncompliance with the peace agreement but not for compliance, outside actors must be seen by combatants as both strong and sufªciently impartial. During an electoral cycle, opposing combatant parties, as well as the population and civil society, can provide their views on how well each side is complying with the electoral laws and other rules established by the settlement; but because signals may be biased, international actors must check them and respond appropriately.
international involvement. After the Cold War, international actors had both an interest in and the tools needed to foster peace. Major powers, no longer ªghting proxy wars, were in a particularly good position to help end civil conºict. 37 UN peacekeeping became more prevalent, but neither pervasive nor persistent, as mentioned earlier. 38 Meanwhile, international interest in low-cost intervention, such as unarmed involvement, increased rapidly. 39 Democracy-promotion programs spread gradually, providing new tools for external actors to use along with electoral participation provisions to overcome two sets of commitment problems. The ªrst set of tools consists of international election observation processes. Before 1989, international election observation occurred in less than 10 percent of all elections worldwide; by the 2000s, more than 80 percent of all elections were being observed by international monitors. 40 International election observation provides information about whether power is being distributed according to the agreed-upon rules throughout electoral cycles, extending the coordination capabilities of electoral participation provisions described above. As democracy-promotion programs spread around the world, starting in regions neighboring Western powers, 41 they produced expectations of external engagement in states not yet affected by them. 42 In states with civil conºicts, such expectations changed the form of peace settlements and combatants' behavior. When some states are subjected to rigorous international observation and receive incentives for playing by established rules, it is more likely that neighboring states' noncompliance will be detected and sanctioned. 43 These sorts of mechanisms are found in many states, including many post-conºict states. 44 Extant work suggests that international observers base their benchmarks on the terms of settlements, privileging them over other democratic norms, in post-conºict contexts. 45 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, the European Union (EU) measured the elections beginning in 1996 using the "yardstick" of the 1995 Dayton agreement, 46 and showed that the combatant parties had complied with that set of standards, even though the agreement's design of elections around ethnic quotas conºicted with EU democracy standards. 47 The EU's report on Burundi in 2010 noted similar ªndings. Focusing on whether the parties meet the terms of the settlements, established as electoral participation provisions, is useful for overcoming commitment problems and stabilizing peace. 48 The second set of tools available to external actors consists of conditional economic and political incentives-that is, promises of rewards and threats of punishment. The former includes foreign aid, especially democracy and governance assistance, party aid, and election aid, as well as membership in popular intergovernmental organizations and treaties. The latter includes the threat or actual withdrawal of any of these beneªts, as well as other sanctions and bans. 49 After the Cold War, the availability of foreign aid and loans increased 43. Hyde uses regional percentage of elections observed to predict election observation in the next year. See Hyde, The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma, pp. 81-83. Simpser and Donno use regional percentage of elections observed by high-quality monitors as an instrument. They argue that these regional trends in observation are likely driven by the preferences and capabilities of international actors sending these missions. They then perform tests showing that these trends predict engagement in the particular state. See Simpser and Donno, "Can International Election Monitoring Harm Governance?" 44. Post-conºict elections, in general, receive more observation than other kinds of elections, though the degree varies by region. Cases of post-conºict elections that did not receive electoral observation include Mali after 1991, Djibouti after 1994, and the Philippines after 1995. (Peace agreements in these cases did not include participation provisions, likely because of low expectations of engagement. signiªcantly and became, in many cases, conditional on compliance with set standards, as reported by international election observers. 50 Democracy and governance aid, in particular, which could most easily be tied to compliance with electoral rules, increased over the 1990s and into the 2000s. 51 Many post-1989 settlements also have included the establishment of trust funds or other assistance for former rebel groups' political parties, for whom even small reductions in resources can be costly. 52 For instance, the rebel group RENAMO decided against returning to ªghting during Mozambique's ªrst post-conºict election when it was threatened with the loss of an $18 million UN-administered trust fund. 53 International actors apply much of this conditionality, however, to the incumbent government, which is more able than the rebel group to renege on settlements from its position of strength in state institutions. In Guatemala, for example, the UN mission's greatest successes following the 1996 settlement came when the mission was able to convince international aid donors to impose "'constructive conditionality' on the government to follow through with the peace process." 54 The United Nations leads most observation missions during initial post-conºict elections and also coordinates foreign donors on conditional incentives.
As stated earlier, for international observation and conditional incentives to be effective, international actors must be willing to criticize and sanction combatant parties' noncompliance with the terms of settlements. Existing evidence suggests that international actors do use these mechanisms against combatant parties, evaluating noncompliance rigorously and enacting sanctions when needed, 55 including withdrawing aid and other beneªts. 56 This type of external engagement is also effective because it is low cost, partly because participatory electoral cycles increase coordination over time (as discussed earlier) and partly because cultural norms and institutions support this involvement in elections. Cultural norms and institutions have changed since the end of the Cold War. First, with the fall of the Soviet Union, Western power secured elections as the method to legitimately distribute power and produced conventions on when to assess compliance with state rules on power distribution. 57 With these liberal norms in place, elections began to attract international media attention, monitoring, and related aid. 58 Second, democracy-promotion programs became a widely acceptable method of international involvement among domestic actors, 59 removing the need for interveners to overcome domestic actors' sovereignty concerns, and thus reducing resistance to this form of intervention. 60 Third, the institutionalization of observation and assistance provisions that accompanies elections eases the logistical burden of enforcement.
External engagement through electoral participation provisions, particularly with the spread of democracy-promotion programs, is therefore less costly, and thus more credible, than alternatives such as armed international intervention.
implications of external engagement and alternative theories Two hypotheses follow from the above discussion of external engagement theory. First, if electoral participation provisions serve as low-cost, long-term mechanisms for credibly monitoring and incentivizing compliance, compared to alternatives that are likely more precarious, signatories to a settlement should expect marginally better payoffs for compliance, making them less likely to return to conºict.
Hypothesis 1: Peace agreements with electoral participation provisions are associated with a lower likelihood of conºict recurrence than peace agreements without these provisions.
Evidence of H1 would be consistent with external engagement theory and would challenge the existing literature's expectations that post-conºict elections have no effect, or perhaps even a negative effect, on peace. It would also be consistent, however, with three potential alternative explanations for this relationship. First, given that the parties to the conºict negotiate the provisions of the settlement, it is possible that a selection effect drives the relationship between provisions and peace. For example, the decision to include electoral participation provisions might reºect combatants' private (and potentially unobservable) information about the stability of a settlement. 61 Thus, the presence of electoral provisions may simply be correlated with, rather than causally contribute to, peace. 62 A second alternative explanation is that combatants view elections as the most legitimate mechanism for distributing power, and are therefore more likely to abide by their results. Third, elections might be associated with better governance, which could increase accountability, and thereby the propensity for peace. 63 Second, if external engagement theory is correct, the relationship between electoral participation provisions and peace should hold when combatants expect international actors to monitor elections and provide incentives conditional on compliance. If a positive relationship between electoral participation provisions and peace is found (H1), it should hold in cases in which combatants expect enforcement of these provisions by external actors. In this sense, these external engagement expectations are moderating variables. 
Testing External Engagement Theory
This section offers tests of my two hypotheses using cross-national data. It also provides summary statistics on whether external actors engage as expected when electoral participation provisions are implemented. dependent variable: conºict recurrence across settlements The universe of cases for this cross-national analysis comprises settlements from 1975 to 2005 signed to solve, regulate, or outline a process to resolve the incompatibilities between two or more sides ªghting any type of internal conºict that resulted in twenty-ªve or more battle deaths per year. 64 The period thus provides time after 2005 to assess the recurrence of conºict and other election-related outcomes; the period also coincides with the third wave of democratization, which began in 1974, limiting the comparison to cases that experienced normative pressure to hold elections. 65 (To produce comparisons only after 1989 to further standardize the counterfactual, I also include an indicator of the Cold War.) I cluster continuous peace processes, treating sets of negotiations that end with a single solution as a settlement, because peace is not expected to follow each negotiation, but rather the settlement these negotiations produce. 66 I also convert these data to dyadic agreements between each signing rebel group and the government because conºict recurs on a dyadic level. 67 66. Clustered peace processes include, for example, the UN-run negotiations in El Salvador. In other cases, earlier accords in processes are not recorded, so clustering also reduces reporting bias. I control for provisions calling for further processes that do not take place, and the results hold. Other datasets, such as the PAM noted above, also cluster. 67. For example, in Cambodia, three rebel groups signed the Paris agreement in 1991, but the Khmer Rouge soon returned to combat. In my analysis, most of the comparison is across agreements (only 11 percent of the settlements have multiple rebel groups signing). Therefore, though I analyze dyadic results to accurately test the theory, the results are similar, though sometimes weaker, on the agreement level. This weakness is not surprising, given that the sample size is smaller. In addition to this robustness check, I also always cluster the standard errors by state throughout the analyses.
The variation I explore is conºict recurrence within each dyad that signs a peace agreement to terminate civil conºict. Using the standard Uppsala Conºict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conºict Dataset, 68 I identify whether the rebel group that signs the peace agreement reenters the dataset under the same name or that of a UCDP/ PRIO-coded alliance or merger, indicating a return to conºict at the threshold of at least twenty-ªve battle deaths per year. 69 I code whether the conºict ever recurred for the dyad through 2010; however, because most dyads that fail do so within ªve years, I use an indicator of whether the agreement fails within ªve years as the dependent variable in the main analyses. 70 The resulting dataset contains 110 dyadic peace agreements (with 12 emerging from settlements with multiple signatories) between 81 different dyads in 49 civil conºicts in 43 states from 1975 to 2005. 71 In 47 instances (43 percent of these agreements), the dyads returned to civil conºict within ªve years. 72 independent variable: electoral participation provisions As noted earlier, electoral participation provisions are clauses concerned with holding elections and allowing rebel groups to participate as political parties. I analyzed the text of all of the accords that produced the 110 settlements to identify whether they include (1) clear expectations that an election would be held on a set date, which I also code as extant if elections have been held regularly for two cycles and the settlement does not interrupt them, and (2) clear expectations that both sides would ªeld candidates. In practice, governments typically conducted these elections. To include rebel groups, therefore, the settlement must have (1) legalized rebel groups as political parties; (2) created a transitional government set to include rebel groups as parties; or occasionally (3) included rebel groups that already participated in elections during the conºict, either on their own or through alliances with political parties. In 69. For robustness checks, I use the UCDP coding of whether implementation failed, including failure because of lower-level conºict or renegotiation, and the results hold. Additionally, a few initial agreements were renegotiated without intervening conºict; I exclude renegotiations because keeping them would inºate the success ex post (as noted in table A1 in the supporting information). The results hold either way. 70. Other speciªcations of the dependent variable, including different speciªcations of time until failure as well as the level of failure, described above, are also included. 71. Among all agreements, 18 cases are missing full text. In 8 cases, detailed summaries provide conªdence for interpreting provisions, but in 10 cases, all Chadian, even detailed summaries are missing. The results hold when dropping the uncertain cases. 72. The data are shown in the supporting information (table A1) . The supporting information, as well as the data, code, and results are available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/ matanock. Djibouti, for example, elections were held regularly for at least two cycles before the signing of a settlement in 1994; the settlement stipulated that "once the present Peace agreement has been signed, FRUD [the rebel group Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy] will become a legal political party." 73 Of the 110 dyadic peace agreements, 42 (38 percent) include electoral participation provisions. 74 Those without such provisions usually outline other institutional arrangements for distributing political power, such as territorial division to allow some control by each side.
moderating variables: expectations of external engagement External engagement theory implies not only that electoral participation provisions correlate with more enduring peace (H1), but also that this relationship should hold when combatants expect international actors to engage through elections to monitor and incentivize compliance (H2). Therefore, it is necessary to measure combatant expectations of external engagement in elections that theoretically supports peace and stability (rather than backing one side as happens in proxy wars, for instance).
This variable is difªcult to measure directly, but there are three variables that can serve as proxies. First, I use the end of the Cold War as a proxy variable because it coincided with increased international coordination on civil conºict termination and the development of tools that allowed electoral processes to be more easily observed and incentivized. The end of the Cold War should thus increase expectations of appropriate external involvement. 75 However, because the end of the Cold War likely produced change through multiple mechanisms (e.g., lessening support to armed actors), I focus primarily on the two other proxy variables, both of which are closely tied to the spread of democracy-promoting programs by region, 76 and each of which should there-Bullets for Ballots 111 73. A few less clear cases are recoded as robustness checks: peace agreements that open the way for multiparty competition broadly and those where combatants participated in elections before the conºict are included; and those that integrate groups in regional but not national transitional governments before elections are excluded (table A1). The results hold. 74. This deªnition of electoral participation provisions includes provisions that are not implemented. Comparing electoral participation with other provisions whose implementation may be harder to observe could bias my results. In rare cases when the government or the rebel group failed to implement electoral provisions, the uncooperative side was usually punished, as external engagement theory anticipates. Evidence on this appears in Matanock, "International Insurance"; and Matanock, Electing Peace. Full implementation by 2015 occurred in 34 agreements with electoral participation provisions, including 6 that were later renegotiated, producing peaceful electoral participation by the ex-rebel parties. 75. Existing intervention literature also portrays the end of the Cold War as a shock that should increase expectations and thus involvement of international actors. I follow one prominent study in using 1989 as the date of the Cold War's end. See Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? 76. I follow Hyde, The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma, in designating ªve regions: sub-Saharan Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and North Africa and the Middle East. The region measure is the same for both proxy variables discussed below. I also code alternative speciªcations, however, fore increase expectations of appropriate external engagement. The ªrst is the percentage of legislative elections in the region being observed by international monitors in the year prior to the agreement, excluding the state being examined. 77 The second is the percentage of all development assistance in the region devoted to democracy and governance promotion, averaged over the two prior years. 78 Theories about democracy promotion argue, and show empirically, that external engagement spreads within regions, driven by systemic characteristics such as international interest in a region, making it more likely that other states within a particular region can expect the same type of external engagement in future elections. Regions neighboring the United States and Europe were the ªrst subjects of external engagement. International election observation, crucial for detecting noncompliance in post-conºict situations, followed these regional trends, 79 as did democracy and governance aid. 80 These regional trends, and the diffusion theories associated with them, suggest that states in regions with higher rates of international election observation and associated aid should be more likely to expect external engagement to monitor and incentivize compliance with the terms established in peace agreements. 81 Importantly, these lagged regional variables are also likely exogenous: inviting international election observers and receiving associated aid could be highly endogenous to expectations about peace and an aspect of implementation. 82 In contrast, the regional variables, which are from past years and even exclude the state in question, are unlikely to be determined by the settlement's implementation or by how promising peace is. Interviews that I conducted with UN and Carter Center ofªcials indicate that nongovernmental organizations tend to engage in unstable states and regions, places that are less promising for peace, further supporting the exogeneity of these variables. Also, International Security 41:4 112 such as continents, clusters of countries sharing regional organizations, and UCDP/PRIO's classiªcation of regions. None of these alternative speciªcations alter the results substantially. existing work shows that regional trends of increasing external engagement do not reºect the spread of democracy or other aspects of governance, which could foster stability. 83 Regional variables thus represent plausible proxies for combatants' expectations of international engagement and are less likely than provisions to face selection effects. To test H2, then, I interacted each measure with electoral participation provisions in the analyses. 84 electoral participation provisions and enduring peace Consistent with external engagement theory, the data show that settlements that contain electoral participation provisions are more enduring (see ªgure 1). Indeed, ªve years (sixty months) after settlements have been signed, about 75 percent of signatories to settlements with electoral participation provisions are still at peace, compared to about 50 percent of those without such provisions. The result is statistically signiªcant. 85 This simple comparison is consistent with H1.
In addition, when peace agreements fail, they usually do so within the ªrst ªve years (again, see ªgure 1). This result reºects the impact of commitment problems, given that at the start of the implementation process, combatants are most likely to return to ªghting at any sign their opponent will defect. The variation of interest is therefore whether they fail more or less frequently with electoral participation provisions (and, as a moderating factor, expectations of external engagement). This article thus uses a logistic regression model to identify covariates of peace among combatants, or, more precisely, negative correlations with conºict recurrence between the signatories within ªve years of the settlement. 86 I cluster the standard errors by state in all model speciªcations because observations may be related. 87
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83. Simpser and Donno, "Can International Election Monitoring Harm Governance?" p. 507. 84. I argue that electoral participation provisions facilitate international engagement (both international observation and associated aid), but observation and aid alone might also produce enduring peace. The interaction terms test each proposition. 85. A log-rank test for equality of survivor functions suggests a statistically signiªcant difference between the curves (at a 0.01 level). 86. This variable captures all but four failures, including the failure of the peace agreement between the Colombian government and Ejército Popular de Liberación, for example, which failed after thirteen years. Scholars commonly use such methods to model correlations between the type of termination and conºict recurrence. See, for example, Monica Duffy Toft, "Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?" International Security, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Spring 2010), pp. 7-36. Given the small size of the dataset and small number of controls, however, I re-ran the analysis using generalized linear models; the results are similar. Finally, conºict recurrence could also be conceptualized via analysis that explicitly models the time to recurrence as a function of the conºict and settlement characteristics-and also potentially of post-settlement characteristics. I therefore also re-ran the analysis using duration models. Note that failure within ªve years is a hazard rate, as The results show that electoral participation provisions are associated with more enduring peace, thus supporting H1. These results are stable across other methods of estimating these effects. Conºict recurs within ªve years in 21 percent of agreements with electoral participation provisions, in contrast to 56 percent of those without these provisions. 88 The relationship is shown in table 2. 89 Substantively, the effect translates into an 80 percent increase in the probability of enduring peace (44 percent compared to 79 percent).
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88. See the cross-tabulations in the supporting information (table A5) . If the independent variable is the implementation of participatory post-conºict elections, rather than the inclusion of electoral participation provisions, conºict recurs in 7 percent of cases, compared to 55 percent of those in which participatory post-conºict elections were not held. This result is even stronger than the result for inclusion of electoral participation provisions. Including implementation, however, is determined post-treatment and potentially biased; thus, provisions are the preferred measure. 89. See table 7.0-2 in the supporting information, which shows that a similar relationship holds with potentially confounding variables. All analysis was run in Stata 13, and the interpretations were produced with the new margins and marginsplot commands, which can be applied to interactions. See Richard Williams, "Using the Margins Command to Estimate and Interpret Adjusted Predictions and Marginal Effects," Stata Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2012), pp. 308-331. persistence of peace when parties expect external engagement To further test external engagement theory, I examine H2 using the same models, but including the proxy variables interacted with electoral participation provisions to assess the conditional effects. 90 The results are also consistent with external engagement theory: the association between electoral participation provisions and peace holds when combatants expect external engagement. First, during the Cold War, combatants should not have expected external actors to detect and sanction compliance through elections, and, indeed, no peace agreements with electoral participation provisions were signed prior to 1989. 91 This means that the coefªcient on electoral participation provisions can be read as the effect of electoral participation provisions on peace in the post-1989 period (model 2 in table 2), and it shows a large and statistically signiªcant reduction in the risk of conºict recurrence.
Second, the interactions of the regional democracy-promotion variables and electoral participation provisions are negative and statistically signiªcant; to interpret these relationships, I calculate the adjusted predicted probabilities of each type of peace agreement at each value of the two regional proxies. 92 The Bullets for Ballots 115 90. The two democracy-promotion variables are most plausible as proxies for expectations of sufªciently impartial external engagement. These variables introduce exogeneity, and they could even be thought of as instruments for electoral participation provisions. As a robustness check, I used both variables as instruments, separately and together, and the results hold. 91. Coding electoral participation provisions is more difªcult for a few early cases, so those cases are included in the re-coding robustness check noted above, and the results hold. 92. The models can be found in the supporting information (table A6). The interpretation follows the recommendation of Thomas Brambor, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder, "Understand- predicted probability of conºict recurrence with electoral participation provisions compared to those without these provisions indicates that when at least 40 percent of elections held in the region during the previous year were internationally observed, electoral participation provisions are associated with a decreased risk of conºict recurrence (and the effect is statistically signiªcant when at least 60 percent of elections were observed) (ªgure 2). The same is true when democracy and governance assistance constitute at least 3 percent of aid distributed to the region over the previous two years (and at 7 percent, the effect is statistically signiªcant) (ªgure 3). The proxy variables for combatant expectations of external engagement do not reduce the risk of conºict recurrence on their own in these models, or later as controls; rather, they moderate the relationship between electoral participation provisions and peace, as external engagement theory implies. assessing alternative explanations and robustness checks The above results stand in contrast to studies that expect a negative association between electoral participation provisions and enduring peace. These results are consistent with H1 and H2 implied by external engagement theory, but there are several alternative explanations for some of these results. A selection effect could drive the relationship between electoral participation provisions and the endurance of peace: the strategic decision made by combatants to include electoral participation provisions might reºect their private (and potentially unobservable) information about the stability of the conºict's end. For example, the combatants may know that contraband funding that has ªnanced weapons purchases is no longer available, making peace a more attractive option. If combatants then include electoral participation provisions in those cases, the provisions should correlate with, but not cause, more enduring peace. 93 Other alternatives posit other causal logics or omitted variables that could produce a relationship between electoral participation provisions and enduring peace. In this section, I describe some testing of the most obvious selection effects, which shows that these effects do not seem to produce the correlation between electoral participation provisions and more enduring peace. I then I discuss other empirical strategies to increase conªdence in a causal relationship between electoral participation provisions and enduring peace. Next, I describe the controls that I use to test some alternative explanations as part of this approach. Finally, I discuss the results of these models and additional robustness checks, highlighting evidence that is most consistent with external engagement theory.
provisions not limited to easier cases for peace. Existing work has found that conºicts with more deaths and displacement, those that feature contraband funding, and identity conºicts are more likely to recur and thus are harder to settle than other types of conºicts; in contrast, secessionist conºicts are less likely to recur and therefore are easier to settle. 94 Moreover, weak states, measured by variables such as low gross domestic product per capita and more mountainous terrain, also predict conºict occurrence, likely making them harder cases for enduing peace. 95 To test the selection effect, I assess whether electoral participation provisions are included in easier or harder settlements. If anything, the results demonstrate that electoral participation provisions are included in peace agreements in conºicts that are harder to settle, 96 including those involving more conºict deaths, lower state capacity, more mountainous terrain, and more contraband ªnancing. 97 In addition, as external engagement theory would imply, electoral A4 in the supporting information. These results generally suggest that strong rebel groups operating in weak states may be better able to secure electoral participation provisions, compared to weak rebel groups operating in strong states. The former may have more leverage in negotiations, and, crucially, may also be more likely to win seats in elections after settlements. Cases with strong rebels (and a weak government) may nevertheless be harder to settle than those with weak rebels (and a strong government), because strong rebels can ªght harder than weak rebels, making a settlement more precarious. The correlations between strength and electoral participation provisions are not robust, however. Many of the measurements of relative strength are ºawed-rebel troop count, for example, is coded for the entire conºict period prior to the peace agreement even though it changes over time-and the correlations between strength and enduring peace are not consistent once other controls are added. In addition, rebel groups vary substantially in their relative strength at the ballot box, obtaining from 0 to 80 percent of the vote share in postconºict elections (see the supporting information, table A4.0-1, ªgure A2). Nonetheless, I control for measures of strength when evaluating the effect of electoral participation provisions on peace, participation provisions are more likely to be included when domestic actors expect external engagement through democracy-promotion programs. 98 strategies to further assess alternative explanations. Initial evidence, then, runs contrary to an explanation based on selection effects, implying that the correlation between electoral participation provisions and enduring peace may be causal. Still, there could be unobservable selection that I cannot capture, or another explanation could be at work.
To address this issue, I use multiple tests and sources of data to increase conªdence in a causal relationship between electoral participation provisions and enduring peace. First, H2, suggesting that the relationship should hold only when combatants expect external actors to engage, is a test of external engagement theory. However, it is also useful that the proxy variables included in the interactions-the end of the Cold War and the regional trends in democracypromotion programs-are exogenous. In other words, these variables are unlikely to be affected by whether a particular conºict is easy to settle. The evidence in the prior subsection strongly supports H2, and thus provides evidence for external engagement theory, but it counters alternative theories, especially a selection explanation for the correlation based on settlement ease.
Second, to isolate the relationship between electoral participation provisions and enduring peace, I control for possible confounding variables, including other predictors of conºict recurrence, settlement design, and post-conºict elections. 99 I include controls for conºict severity (including conºict size and duration; state strength, measured using gross domestic product per capita; and the balance between the rebel group and the government), 100 settlement difªculty (including number of past failed agreements; number of factions signing and not signing; and whether further negotiations were stipulated in the agreement), group goals (including territorial aims; ethnic and religious agendas; Marxist platforms; and attempts to totally overthrow the state), international relationships (including peacekeeping missions and indicators of settlements signed during the Cold War or after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001), 101 and measures of democracy and development (including democracy levels at the state and regional levels, as well as population size). 102 These are measures used in other studies, and they may affect settlement design and conºict recurrence. 103 In addition, I control for region and time-period indicators, as well as the interaction of these variables, which should soak up some of the variation speciªc to particular geographic areas or temporal periods. 104 Third, I assess whether electoral participation provisions are selected in conºicts that are easier to settle by examining whether they are more likely to be included with other power-sharing provisions. The explanation for the correlation could be that settlements include many provisions when combatants expect post-conºict stability. Again, their expectation of stability, rather than the provisions, could then be driving the correlation with more enduring peace. I therefore control for power-sharing provisions besides electoral participation provisions, including those to reform the security sector; to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate combatants; and to integrate government or civil service 105 -each of which may reduce conºict recurrence. If provisions are simply included as a result of such selection effects, rather than driving a causal effect, they should be negatively correlated with conºict recurrence and positively correlated with electoral participation provisions (results showing the opposite are in the section below). 106 Finally, the case study also helps assess the mechanism, further testing the theories.
International Security 41:4 120 101. See also ibid. for aid and trade dependence. 102. I also include good governance controls (including degree of corruption, bureaucratic quality, and law and order) in the supporting information (table A7.2). Elections may foster the rule of law and increase the effectiveness of bureaucracies, while reducing corruption, which could explain why peace endures. See, for example, Fearon, "Governance and Civil War Onset"; and Walter, "Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War." These variables, however, are not highly correlated with electoral participation provisions. 103. Summary statistics and data sources for all of these controls-and for settlement provisions, discussed below-are available in the supporting information. I also include alternative variables and the results hold. See table A2 and codebook. 104. I show ten-year indicators, but the results also hold with ªve-year indicators. One-year indicators interacted with region indicators approach collinearity with the regional democracy promotion variables, producing models that do not converge. 105. I use the UCDP data to capture these provisions, which broadly deªne each of these categories. See Harbom, Högbladh, and Wallensteen, "Armed Conºict and Peace Agreements." 106. Strategic inclusion may explain some cases in which peace agreements include multiple provisions. See, for example, Hartzell and Hoddie, "The Art of the Possible." controls and additional robustness checks. With controls included in the baseline models with electoral participation provisions (table 2) , the correlation between electoral participation provisions and enduring peace remains strong across speciªcations, which is consistent with external engagement theory but not with alternative explanations (table 3) . 107 These speciªcations include the controls described above for other power-sharing provisions, conºict severity, settlement difªculty, group goals, international relationships (including peacekeeping missions), and measures of democracy and development, as well as a ªnal set with all variables that are statistically signiªcant in any speciªcation. Across all of these speciªcations, the coefªcient on electoral participation provisions remains negative and statistically signiªcant. 108 Meanwhile, few controls are statistically signiªcant, and the evidence is not consistent with alternative theories. The results suggest that larger and longer conºicts, for instance, are more likely to recur following a negotiated settlement (statistically signiªcant effects across speciªcation); rebel groups that do not aim for total control of the state or that seek control in only part of the state's territory are less likely to return to conºict after signing a peace agreement; and conºicts involving more factions are more likely to dissolve back into ªghting after a settlement (statistically signiªcant effects in some model speciªcations but not across all speciªcations). UN peacekeeping does not have a statistically signiªcant correlation with peace in these models, 109 which suggests that the main effect is not driven by peacekeepers who push elections, for example, but then increase peace through other actions alone. The results also do not support a good-governance argument: governance controls are not signiªcantly associated with peace, and they do not change the association between peace and electoral participation provisions, suggesting that they are not driving the relationship. 110 Finally, including region and time-period controls, and their interaction, and still seeing the same correlation between electoral participation provisions and more enduring peace, suggests that these relationships are not based on simple temporal or geographic trends.
Moreover, not all provisions reduce the likelihood of conºict recurrence. Provisions to integrate the civil service and government are associated with a greater likelihood of conºict recurrence (table 3 shows the relationships are positive, and the former sometimes statistically signiªcant). The coefªcient on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration is negative and statistically signiªcant. Taken together, these ªndings suggest that some other aspects of peace agreements are also important, but that not all of them are associated with peace. Electoral participation provisions still have a statistically significant effect when these other provisions are included, and the provisions are not highly correlated with each other, 111 suggesting that an omitted propensity for peace, perhaps private information held by combatants that could lead them to include many different provisions, is not driving the results. In sum, when all of these other provisions and possible confounds are included, electoral participation provisions are still positively correlated with more enduring peace, which is consistent with external engagement theory.
correlates of peace How does the relationship between electoral participation provisions and enduring peace explored in this article compare to existing ªndings on conºict termination? First, previous studies have found that any negotiated settlement, as compared to a military victory by one side, is associated with less enduring peace. 112 To assess how well settlements with electoral participation provisions perform relative to these other options, I modeled all peace periods of at least one year following a civil conºict. 113 Compared to conºicts that drop below the twenty-ªve-battle-death threshold-when international actors may be especially able to push one side to victory or to help negotiate a settlement-a victory reduces the risk of renewed conºict by 90 percent, while an agreement with electoral participation provisions reduces this risk by 74 percent. The former is therefore still the best option, but the latter is better than any other type of peace agreement or cease-ªre.
Second, as discussed earlier, existing studies are pessimistic about the ability of post-conºict elections to produce enduring peace, but they do not pay considerable attention to the type of election that follows a conºict. I therefore examine whether any electoral provisions, including those that do not require all sides to compete as parties, 114 have the same correlation with more enduring peace as do those calling for participation by rebel groups. 115 The correlation of any election and conºict recurrence is small and not statistically signiªcant in these data, which is consistent with some previous studies and challenges the current practice that does not distinguish between these categories. 116 Only by narrowing the focus to electoral participation provisions is the negative correlation statistically signiªcant. This evidence, too, supports the mechanism and is consistent with external engagement theory.
External Engagement in the Case of El Salvador
The mechanism of external engagement suggests that outside actors should be likely to engage in electoral processes once peace agreements are signed. Comparing levels of engagement is difªcult both because the counterfactual is not entirely clear and because such comparisons require selecting successful implementation of post-conºict elections, which potentially introduces bias. Nevertheless, I can examine rates of international observation, democracy and governance aid, and conditionality around elections, comparing those elections produced by participation provisions as opposed to any other postconºict elections, to evaluate if the results are plausibly consistent with external engagement theory's expectation that post-conºict elections that follow electoral participation provisions attract more external engagement than those that do not. The results show that this is indeed the case. 117 In addition, conditionality-punishments or rewards conditioned on abiding by the rules of the game 118 -is also statistically signiªcantly higher prior to these same elections (present in 77 percent of these cases, compared to 44 percent otherwise). These results suggest that participation provisions are associated with external engagement through the electoral process as the theory implies.
To further test the mechanism, I analyzed El Salvador's 1992 settlement using process tracing to assess whether the mechanism of external engagement plausibly explains the correlation between electoral participation provisions and peace. 119 In choosing this case, I sought a clear change in expectations of external enforcement around which to examine the causal chain. A moment in which these expectations should increase, at least in the regions closest to the West, is the end of the Cold War. 120 As discussed earlier, its end decreased coordination problems around terminating civil conºict and coincided with the spread of democracy-promotion programs. As the Cold War wound down, then, expectations about external enforcement increased, driving the causal chain implied by external engagement theory. 121 Once a peace deal is signed, the theory implies, former government and rebel forces would try to take advantage of moments in which they were relatively stronger. The theory also implies, however, that the electoral process established by participation provisions would reverse these incentives and foster peace. Speciªcally, the theory implies that international actors would monitor and supply aid conditioned on compliance, and that this mechanism, rather than troops threatening coercive punishment, would ensure a sufªcient level of compliance by each side to maintain peace.
I therefore examined all civil conºicts that began before the collapse of the Soviet Union, featured continuous ªghting between rebel groups and the government, and then terminated through settlements after the end of the Cold War. Ten such cases included electoral participation provisions, and each shows extensive external engagement around the participatory electoral processes, including international election observation and related aid available to be conditioned on compliance. 122 In selecting one case to process trace in this piece, I sought a hard case from among these: it should be especially difªcult to persuade rebel groups that fought against U.S.-backed governments during the Cold War that international actors, particularly the United States and intergovernmental organizations to which it belongs, will enforce compliance on both sides. Leftist guerrilla groups from Central America ªt these criteria. If any rebel group would not need international support, it would be a stronger group. For this reason, I selected El Salvador over Guatemala, which had a weaker rebel group, making this the hardest possible case among the set in which to expect this shift.
The robust insurgency in El Salvador, which began in 1980, had its roots in land rights and labor policies. 123 The right-wing government of El Salvador, led by the Nationalist Republican Alliance, which had U.S. backing during the Cold War, fought the leftist FMLN guerillas, which had foreign support from the Soviet Union. At times, the FMLN was a robust rebel group that looked as if it could defeat the government. However, the government and the FMLN reached a stalemate sometime in 1987 at the latest, following resource losses and war weariness among supporters on both sides. 124 No settlement had been possible during the Cold War because the FMLN, in particular, was concerned about commitment problems vis-à-vis the government, and it did not have a credible foreign guarantor of a peace agreement because the only international actors involved (the United States and the Soviet Union) had instead taken sides in the conºict. Leaders on both sides were well aware of this bias. 125 U.S. and Soviet sponsorship also kept the cost of conºict low for combatants through the supply of weapons and other resources.
By 1989, both the FMLN and the El Salvadoran government had lost their sponsors, and international actors had begun to engage in a more impartial push for peace. 126 In January of that year, the FMLN took the "unprecedented" step of signaling its willingness to commit to democratic procedures by asking to participate in the March elections, if the rules were changed (which the government did not yet do). 127 The rebels had become more conªdent as guarantees were "awarded to the electoral processes" to incentivize all sides to comply with the rules; these guarantees came in part from "international pressure" wherein actors no longer backed a particular side but rather sought to stabilize peace through their involvement. 128 For example, after the election of George H.W. Bush, the FMLN approached the administration about taking steps toward ending El Salvador's civil conºict, emboldened by the administration's less partisan stance in the region. 129 Peace negotiations followed, fea-
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turing the FMLN's proposal to participate. 130 U.S. ofªcials met with guerrilla commanders in 1991 to assure them that the United States would "encourage lasting stability in the region" with elections at the center of those efforts, and it seemed to work: Ana Guadalupe Martínez, an FMLN leader, remarked, "Our attitude has changed [and now] we think the U.S. military group [U.S. military advisers and the U.S. embassy, according to the report] can help in the transition to peace." 131 In 1992, the FMLN and the El Salvadoran government signed a peace agreement, after both sides had come to believe that sufªciently impartial international actors would be available to monitor and incentivize compliance with the peace agreement through a participatory electoral process. Looking to the elections resulting from the peace process, the FMLN would depend "more on international pressures than on legislative clout or popular mobilization to achieve its goals." 132 The deal, even with complete compliance, left in place a relatively closed electoral system as part of an elite bargain between the sides. 133 At the same time, however, the electoral process provided extensive external opportunities to both monitor and incentivize compliance. The combatants thus were able to overcome their commitment problems, particularly the FMLN's concern that the government would fail to comply, by "accept[ing] COPAZ [the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace] and the United Nations as guarantors of [the FMLN's] security." 134 The United Nations established a peacekeeping mission during the negotiations to enhance the credibility of its guarantee, but the mission's size was small and its scope limited; it had no punishment mechanism that entailed force. 135 Much of the international involvement in post-conºict El Salvador surrounded the elections. The 1994 elections attracted an inºux of international attention, including about 4,000 international election observers. Crucially, these observers, many supervised by the United Nations, were key in unlocking aid needed by both sides. 136 Ofªcial assistance, including national reconstruction funds that assured each side of "substantial funding," was conditioned on compliance with the peace agreement and thus provided incen-tives to comply. 137 All sides "needed ªnancial resources to implement institutional reforms, land transfers, and reconstruction projects"; the United Nations judged whether both sides demonstrated "good faith and democratic vocation," and, in doing so, it "[inºuenced] the prospects for major international funding." 138 Importantly, these international actors were no longer seen as backing a particular side, as they had during the Cold War. As such, they were able to provide international assurance that the rebels would be protected and that each side would receive aid if it complied with the terms of the peace agreement. 139 Mechanisms for enforcement were brought to bear by international actors against each side when implementation of the settlement's terms stalled (suggesting that compliance would not otherwise have been each side's consistently preferred strategy). Entering into the implementation process, both sides initially failed to reach the benchmarks set in the settlement, either deliberately or because of logistical challenges. In response, international actors threatened to block participation and withhold aid that could have lost the noncomplying party essential support among voters.
Ultimately, this involvement, particularly by the United Nations and the United States, created incentives to obtain sufªcient compliance and continued peace. 140 The government, for example, was slow to demobilize its forces and establish less partisan policing institutions. As the elections approached, and the incumbent party's presidential candidate began to face stiff competition, the United Nations issued public statements about the government's slow progress to pressure the latter into complying. These efforts were accompanied by speciªc threats from the United States and other international actors to withdraw aid. 141 Analysts emphasized that the timing of these threatsbefore the vote-was crucial, because costing the state these critical funds would have been especially unpopular in the elections. 142 The FMLN also initially failed to fully implement the settlement. An arms cache linked to the group exploded in 1993, causing the United Nations to forcefully criticize the FMLN's failure to disarm, and the government to sug-gest banning the rebel group from elections. The threat proved effective as the FMLN revealed and destroyed many other weapons caches. 143 Thus, as both sides increased their accountability prior to the elections, the process also ªxed ªrm deadlines for the most crucial components of the peace agreement. 144 Noncompliance with the accords-usually impeding efforts to redistribute power-persisted beyond the disarmament phase, and external engagement in the electoral process continued to enforce the agreement. For example, when the government failed to issue voter registration cards in a timely manner-many to supporters of the Left who had not previously voted-the United States froze $70 million in U.S. Economic Support Funds; the freeze produced an increase in the pace of voter registration, leading the United Nations to declare that 90 percent of potential voters would likely be registered by the November 1994 deadline. 145 Similarly, when the government attempted to move polling stations from locations where the FMLN had substantial support, the UN electoral observation mission disputed the government's claim that the move was motivated by security concerns and threatened further fund freezes, forcing the government to capitulate. 146 These accountability mechanisms continued to be employed by external actors through subsequent elections, including in 1997; they also received substantial international observation, 147 and donors continued to provide substantial funding that could be conditioned on compliance. 148 Peace persisted in El Salvador following the 1992 peace agreement. Despite some setbacks and slow democratization, international actors kept the deal on track during its implementation, monitoring and incentivizing former combatant party compliance. This evidence of the mechanism is consistent with external engagement theory.
Conclusion
Some settlements that end civil conºicts endure, but others do not. This article demonstrates that electoral participation provisions, clauses included in some peace agreements to transition combatants into political parties, help stabilize peace. In particular, they can facilitate the engagement of external actors, intergovernmental organizations, and foreign donors, who can detect and sanction former combatant parties' noncompliance with such settlements. Electoral participation provisions, which facilitate a particularly low-cost and long-term mechanism for enforcement, became especially effective as democracy-promotion programs spread following the end of the Cold War. By making noncompliance less beneªcial than compliance throughout the implementation of a mutually beneªcial deal, this enforcement mechanism can help overcome commitment problems and contribute to enduring peace.
Cross-national evidence indicates that agreements with electoral participation provisions are an excellent option for stabilizing peace, second only to military victory in their effectiveness. The results are robust, even when accounting for potential selection effects such as whether these provisions are simply included in easier cases for peace (they are not) and other alternative explanations. Case-study evidence also supports the argument. If an international actor wants to help foster peace, but will not support the stronger side in winning a conºict, supporting a settlement with these provisions is its best option.
Counteracting growing concern that post-conºict elections are ineffective or contribute to renewed conºict, these ªndings also demonstrate which kinds of elections can help peace endure. Post-conºict elections that are participatory and internationalized, both of which are demanding conditions, have a discernibly positive impact on peace. The results also offer an important implication about international intervention. The use of peacekeeping troops is costly and therefore relatively rare; there are, however, complements and substitutes to threatening punishment by force. Provisions for electoral participation by former combatant political parties, in combination with international involvement in elections, can detect and increase the cost of noncompliance.
Beyond the implications for scholars' understanding of stable civil conºict settlements, post-conºict elections, and international intervention, this article suggests two major extensions to current research. First, in addition to disaggregating post-conºict elections to examine their relationship with peace, future research should consider whether different post-conºict elections affect other outcomes, particularly democracy. External engagement theory suggests that electoral participation provisions work because they are elite arrange-International Security 41:4 130 ments likely accompanied by low levels of liberalism. 149 A stability-democracy trade-off that may occur through these elections, which are often highly engineered and evaluated for their ability to resolve conºict, merits further investigation. Not many elections carry great uncertainty, however, 150 and as a state develops a post-conºict electoral history, it may move away from some of the rigid guarantees of representation that secure the peace but potentially impede democracy.
Second, future work should consider the external engagement mechanism in light of larger issues of compliance and enforcement in post-conºict settlements. If my theory is correct, aid and other nonmilitary mechanisms can be used to help address domestic political issues beyond the immediate commitment problems associated with settling a civil conºict. These issues include many of interest to the global community, such as improving domestic human rights compliance, reducing fraud during leader transitions, and reducing corruption by incumbent governments. In practice, external engagement will not always be an option; for example, absent electoral cycles with the relevant actors participating as parties, the costs may be too high. Nevertheless, external engagement theory helps identify a much-expanded role for international actors in helping to solve domestic political problems. 151 Two policy implications follow from this study. First, the United Nations and other international peacemakers should propose the inclusion of electoral participation provisions in every future peace agreement. Once an agreement is signed, international actors can make themselves available to identify and sanction instances of noncompliance. Their credibility can be enhanced by being explicit about the goals of post-conºict elections. If the explicit goal is external enforcement of compliance with a settlement, policymakers may be more able to effectively monitor such compliance. For instance, they might send missions out to former combatant strongholds in the lead-up to elections, rather than only to competitive regions. They might also provide more trust funds for combatant parties that have compliance as an explicit condition. A recent example of a trust-fund recipient is Nepal. Some policymakers already implement aspects of this external engagement effectively, but more customization to encourage compliance could be done across cases.
Second, there are still cases in which external engagement through elections is likely to be impractical, perhaps because combatants perceive international organizations as strongly committed to one side or because combatants perceive them to be apathetic. International actors must be interested but not excessively invested in either combatant side if they are to be trusted to detect and sanction noncompliance. In such scenarios, international peacekeepers should identify a bipartisan foreign state, or a collective of impartial states, and seek to signal their commitment to peace. A potentially useful option would be to strengthen intergovernmental organizations so that no single state is entrusted with determining noncompliance or imposing sanctions unilaterally. Intergovernmental bodies that design policy through coordination among many of their members-particularly those that may be on different sides of geostrategic debates-could work around concerns that one side will receive special treatment. The involvement of strong international organizations would take careful crafting, but the possibility that they could decrease the likelihood of renewed ªghting in post-conºict states may make this approach worth serious consideration.
Much work still needs to be done on ways to ensure lasting peace in states that experience civil conºict. This research represents a ªrst step in identifying electoral participation provisions in post-conºict settlements as a means toward achieving that objective.
